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Abstract 
Following the collapse of Communist regimes across Eurasia, securitization became a pressing problem for newly emerging 
democracies as ruling elites in many post-Soviet states used securitization as a shield for retaining power. This study is based 
on case study analyses and has two objectives: to highlight the dynamics of Georgia’s securitization process, and to show how 
this process corresponds to existing theoretical and empirical experience. It is evident that the formulation of threat perceptions 
and the decision making process in Georgia have been constructed and dominated by the elite of the United National Move-
ment (UNM). Georgia’s move under Saakashvili’s regime on securitization has been fairly controversial – it has been respon-
sible for both the rise and then the fall of his regime. During the last decade, Georgia under Saakashvili’s rule has 
represented a bright illustration of the beginning of a successful and then failed securitization process. Research shows that 
securitization can be successful in the short run and is particularly likely to succeed in post-communist and Eurocentric 
countries, ruled by authoritarian or “competitive authoritarian regimes”. However, in the long run, securitization leads to the 
curbing of basic freedoms and the introduction of far-reaching extraordinary measures in the name of security cannot sustain 
itself and  inevitably fails.
Keywords: democracy, Georgia, securitization, “speech act”, threat  
Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, the issue of rethinking the 
security concept became very topical. Numerous scientific 
works were devoted to the broadening of a conception of 
security through the notions of securitization and desecuriti-
zation. This very issue came to a fore with the collapse of the 
communist regimes after the end of the Cold War. With a lack 
of experience in democratic development, many of these re-
gimes used securitization as a shield for retaining power in 
lieu of democratic principles. This research aims to analyze 
the policies of the government of Georgia under the presi-
dent Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2012) in building up a con-
cept of security that sought to influence the population and 
with the objective of keeping and consolidating power. The 
work tries to demonstrate how authorities – through the act 
of securitization – were constructing images of the enemy, 
both military and non-military, depicting threats and strate-
gies of the regime as ultimately culminating in a challenge of 
democratic principles, European values and the well-being 
of the population. The rise and fall of the Saakashvili regime 
in Georgia is an illuminating example of a successful pro-
cess of securitization, when a political elite has succeeded in 
convincing its target audience, and failure, when rule of law, 
universal values and human rights are ignored – leading to a 
rejection of that regime by a disillusioned population. 
This paper aims to study the securitization process and 
respond to the question: how did the government use se-
curitization and what impact did this have on democratic 
processes in the case of Georgia between 2004 and 2012 
under Saakashvili’s rule? 
The theoretical framework of the study is based primarily 
on the Copenhagen School concept of security and a model 
of securitization which can be seen as a more extreme form 
of politicization that envisages both state security and non-
traditional security issues (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998). 
Nowadays this concept represents the best theory on how 
imposed emergency measures are proportional and corre-
late with an existential threat and how undemocratic political 
systems can abuse well-established civil liberties and hu-
man rights under the pretext of security. Furthermore, this 
research proved particularly relevant in trying to understand 
if the securitization model could potentially fit the EU Eastern 
partner countries aiming at integration into European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures.  
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Theoretical Framework: Securitization as 
a Challenge to Young Democracy, Supre-
macy of Law and Basic Freedoms
For the post-Soviet countries, the issue of securitization 
became quite significant, particularly for governments 
aiming to retain power and build up support from the 
political elite within an often corrupt autocratic system. 
Such a political system is maintained by exercising influ-
ence over a population and convincing the audience of the 
necessity for extraordinary and emergency actions in 
response to an existential or imagined threat. In un-
democratic states, the speech act has become increasingly 
important to pursue goals designed by the political elite, but 
in the case of democratic societies the electorate has the 
right to reject the imposed will – the offered issue as an 
existential threat (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998). 
According to Buzan et al., security is a socially con-
structed concept and existential threats are regarded as a 
subjective matter (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998). For that 
reason, a successful build up of the securitization phenom-
enon depends on a shared understanding of sources of se-
curity threats.  In this case, political elites “need to speak the 
language of security” and request adoption of emergency 
measures. It means that the society should accept specific 
issues as an existential threat to a referent object. Thus, a 
security act depends on many ways on successful speech 
acts aiming at persuasion of a relevant audience of the exis-
tential nature of the threat (Collins, 2010, pp. 136-151).  
Convincing the audience to adopt this framework of 
threat perceptions thus becomes a priority for authorities. A 
successful act of securitization in many instances depends 
on the use of exceptional means--“extraordinary measures” 
which can be applied by the relevant government mean 
adoption and implementation of measures that go beyond 
ordinarily accepted rules and practices. According to Buzan 
et al. extraordinary measures are expected to respond to a 
specific issue that is posing an existential threat to a referent 
object. This process involves classification of some issues 
including the construction of an enemy that needs to be im-
plemented during the inception of this process. Specification 
of extraordinary measures depends on the circumstances 
and specificity of the threat nature: whether it is the territo-
rial integrity of a country, organized crime, a sector of the 
economy, accepted values or a state ideology, all of which 
require different and appropriate emergency responses (Bu-
zan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998).
At the same time, it is important to underline the danger 
of securitization especially in post-soviet states; the politi-
cal elites of these republics are characterized by enduring 
totalitarian instincts and an overwhelming desire to keep 
power, often with disregard of laws and democratic prin-
ciples. The policy of securitization can be abused in order 
to legitimize and empower the role of military, police, and 
special security forces in civilian activities (Emmers, 2010, 
pp. 136-151). This point proves to be particularly relevant 
in emerging democracies and in countries where the civi-
lian control of armed and special forces is weak: power is 
concentrated and the media and civil society are inhibited by 
the ruling elite. In the name of security and the necessity of 
taking extraordinary measures to defend the country, the act 
of securitization can lead to the curbing of fundamental liber-
ties, impose the policy of total surveillance over political op-
ponents and detention without proper investigation and trial 
under the pretext of “suspected terrorists and spies”. Buil-
ding the enemy image and the demonization of opponents 
is yet another tool necessary in the exploitation of securiti-
zation by the political elite. The Copenhagen School does 
not consider an act of securitization as a positive process. It 
warns about the negative consequences associated with the 
act of securitization and recommends operating within the 
realm of normal politics, where issues can be discussed and 
addressed within the standard boundaries of politicization 
(Emmers, 2010, pp. 138-142). 
While the Copenhagen School provides a framework to 
understand how or by whom a specific political issue can 
become securitized, there are some issues that are insuffi-
ciently understood empirically. Particularly, why some forms 
of securitization succeed in convincing an audience while 
others fail to do so? It is also important to determine empiri-
cally whether acts of securitization contribute to an effective 
solution of emerged challenges (Emmers, 2010, pp. 136-
151). 
We believe that the present work and case study can 
highlight some shortcomings existing in practice in the secu-
ritization model. Below, we will tackle securitization practices 
and actions undertaken by the Georgian Government during 
the Saakashvili presidency and the types of extraordinary 
measures, introduced by the Georgian authorities and the 
ultimate outcome of those policies. 
Two stages of Securitization in Georgia
Stage 1 (2004-2006)
In 2003, the new Georgian government inherited what 
was arguably a failed state with three breakaway regions. 
Saakashvili and his administration outlined already politi-
cized issues as existential threats to the state: aggressive 
separatism, Russian claims for regaining influence over 
Georgia, organized crime, rampant corruption etc. From the 
early days of the Rose Revolution, the ruling elite had re-
ceived a cart blanche in all decision-making and went on to 
consolidate power. Special powers were given to the Minis-
try of Interior, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice as 
well as to the other law enforcement agencies; these 
institutions received additional human, budgetary and extra 
budgetary resources and started building a repressive 
machine originally directed against criminal gangs and 
aggressive separatism (Kuparadze, 2012). The new 
government—as a securitizing agent—had a significant 
advantage in getting influence over the electorate and 
population as a whole. In the short term, Saakashvili re-
gained control over Adjaria, successfully battled corruption 
and organized crime, conducted initial economic reforms, 
successfully reformed law enforcement structures and 
developed the infrastructure and tourism sector in the 
country. In his first presidential terms, Saakashvili led Ge-
orgia on a path towards democracy, economic liberalization 
and Euro-Atlantic integration (Coffey, 2012). Georgia bet-
ween 2004 and 2006 was recognized as “a beacon of 
democracy” in the region (Bush, 2005). During 
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these years, there was a shared understanding of what con-
stituted a danger to the country’s security and confidence 
towards the regime was remarkably solid. 
Stage 2 (2007-2012)
However, in November 2007, the Georgian government 
faced the worst crisis since it seized power in 2003. A series 
of widespread anti-government demonstrations sparked a 
storm of protest around the country. The government’s de-
cision to use excessive police force against peaceful pro-
testers and the opposition “Imedi” TV station—which was 
subsequently closed down—aggravated the situation. The 
declaration of a state of emergency by the president and 
restrictions imposed on the media led to a disregard of fun-
damental freedoms in Georgia.  Notwithstanding that, in 
2008 president Saakashvili waged a war against Russia 
that ended with catastrophic consequences for Georgia. 
According to Human Rights Watch, Georgia’s human rights 
record remained very alarming from 2010 to 2012 (Human 
Rights Watch. World Report: Georgia, 2012). Harassment 
and intimidation of opposition party activists and other viola-
tions marred the pre-election environment in 2012. In Sep-
tember 2012, sexual abuse and ill-treatment of prison in-
mates were revealed, exposing underlying problems within 
the system.  Rampant abuse of power showed the lengths 
by which the Saakashvili administration attempted to con-
solidate its stranglehold of the political apparatus (De Waal, 
2013).  As a result, in October 2012, the wider population 
rejected the speech act and considered all measures taken 
by the government as illegitimate, choosing instead to sup-
port the Georgian Dream Coalition during the parliamentary 
elections.  
Mikheil Saakashvili – a Main Architect 
of Securitization in Georgia
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 was succeeded by 
parliamentary elections characterized by widespread fraud, 
bringing into power a coalition of three opposition leaders– 
Mikheil Saakashvili (president), Zurab Zhvania – (prime-
minister) and Nino Burjanadze – (speaker of the parlia-
ment). Saakashvili’s party – the United National Movement 
(UNM) won an overwhelming majority in the parliament 
(Welt, 2006). The ruling party would inherit almost absolute 
decision-making power and the new government—as a se-
curitizing agent, had a significant advantage in that it was 
now centrally placed to sway the electorate and the popula-
tion as a whole. 
In the meantime, the political elite was demanding spe-
cial rights and extraordinary means to achieve tangible re-
sults in quickly restructuring of the country. In January 2004, 
Saakashvili requested constitutional reforms to build up new 
state institutions and a strong executive power, radically 
reform the country’s economy and pursue European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration as the future direction of the nation. 
This was the essence of Mikhail Saakashvili’s approach to 
governance (Freizer, 2004).
The ruling party was also beginning to consolidate pow-
er for itself. The UNM redrew the constitution and passed 
new laws. All the while, Saakashvili’s administration rushed 
to turn a failed state into a functioning, modernized Euro-
pean country. The government injected urgency into the re-
forms, leading to a sustained mobilization of political support 
and deployment of resources. However, there was growing 
skepticism and a raising question amongst the populace: 
“to what extend had the authorities respected rule of 
law, protected human rights and how far were they willing 
to adhere to the democratic principles they espo-
use?” (Rimple,2012).  
Centralization of power
From the early days of his presidency Saakashvili started 
building strong vertical structures of power. Through constitu-
tional amendments Saakashvili gained immense power and 
his leadership and influence on Georgian politics became 
unchallengeable (De Waal, 2013). “Saakashvili and his re-
gime had an aura of political invincibility, the widely spread 
perception in the ruling regime and the Georgian public 
alike after Saakashvili’s regime survived the Russian 
invasion of Georgia in August 2008 as well as the mass 
public protests in 2007–2008 and 2009. Many were sure 
that Saakashvili—a ruthless, energetic and skilled political 
operator—would not give up power easily even if retaining 
it involved using violence” (Rukhadze, 2013). His power 
hinged on support from two key members of the cabinet: 
Vano Merabishvili – the Minister of Interior (executor of 
president’s requests) and Zurab Adeishvili – the Minister of 
Justice (organizer of politically motivated trials and tailoring 
laws upon the regime’s request). The UNM political elite 
had gained a tremendous foothold in Georgian politics by 
convincing the population for the need of emergency and 
extraordinary measures in response to a constructed 
existential threat. 
Regaining Control over Media
In the early days of Saakashvilli’s control, he paid great 
attention to the issue of media (Media House Georgia, 
2012). After the Rose Revolution, the main TV companies 
(Rustavi 2, Imedi, and Public Broadcaster – Channel 1) 
moved into the hands of members of the government or 
their associates. Information control was a crucial aspect of 
his policies and he paid great attention particularly to TV 
broadcasting.  According to the Caucasus Research Re-
source Center, in 2011, the main source of news to 89% of 
the population was the TV station providing news on a 
national level (Rustavi 2, “Imedi”, and Public Broadcaster – 
Channel 1) (Rimple, 2012). These particular TV companies 
became an integral part of the government-controlled 
propaganda machine (Rimple, 2012). Giorgi Bokeria – the 
Secretary of the National Security Council received powers 
to “coordinate” press and media work. He became the main 
propaganda chief. All news and information deemed 
unacceptable for the regime were declared or labelled as 
the work of Kremlin agents, Russian spies or the 5th 
Column.  
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Granting to the Internal Special Forces of 
Emergency Powers
In 2004, the Ministry of State Security was merged with the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which also incorporated the De-
partment of Emergency Situations, the Pipeline Protection 
Department and the Border Guard services. Vano Merabish-
vili was appointed minister of the united Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and acquired unlimited powers. He was granted a 
carte blanche to conduct police reforms and orchestrate a 
crackdown on organized crime. Soon, Merabishvili had be-
come one of the most influential figures in Georgia. The Inte-
rior Ministry enlarged its responsibilities, taking control even 
over the distribution of international assistance for Georgian 
IDPs and refugees and the construction of refugee camps. 
He created a well functioning machine of total surveillance 
and persecution within the country (De Waal, 2013). 
The Government’s “Zero Tolerance” Policing Strategy
In November 2004, the newly elected president Saakashvili 
offered a new strategy for fighting organized crime: a “zero 
tolerance” policy (Kuparadze, 2012). The new tough mea-
sures de facto gave the police additional powers. Through 
intensive, proactive street policing implemented through in-
tensive stop and search operations, surveillance and exten-
sive police patrolling, the number of crimes and offences in 
Georgia were significantly reduced. However, the strategy 
increased complaints against the police: further highlighting 
the disrespect for principles of rule of law, rampant brutality, 
and dramatically increased prison populations. 
The “special police checks” became common within this 
strategy. Law enforcement agencies frequently used exces-
sive and brutal force, violated laws and TV-broadcasting be-
came a tool to demonstrate how police could “skilfully act to 
protect the public order”. Offenders were described as en-
emy forces that needed to be tackled urgently. A 19-year-old 
Buta Robakidze was killed on November 24, 2004 during a 
police operation in the Didube district of Tbilisi. Official re-
cords stated that he resisted police alongside his armed four 
friends and that the police was forced to open fire. Following 
the reopening of the investigation in 2012, it was revealed 
that the police fabricated evidence, planted weapons and 
ammunition in the car and an innocent person was deli-
berately killed by the police officer (georgiatimes.info, 
2013).
In yet another notorious case: Zurab Vazagashvili and 
Alexander Khubulov were killed and the third passenger 
wounded by the police while driving a car in central Tbilisi 
on May 2, 2006. The official version of the investigation at 
that time was that the three youngsters in the car were on 
their way to a robbery, which was prevented by the police 
operation. After reopening the investigation, on February 2, 
2015 the persecutor’s office stated that the original version 
of the investigation over robbery was fabricated just to justify 
“the operation” which was an affirmation of police control. 
Eleven high-ranking former and current police officers were 
subsequently arrested for allegedly premeditating killing of 
the aforementioned persons (agenda.ge, 2015).    
Legitimization of Violence
The most scandalous case occurred in January 2006, when 
young banker Sandro Girgvliani was taken to the outskirts 
of Tbilisi to a nearby Okrokana cemetery and was beaten 
to death by high-ranking officers of the Constitutional Secu-
rity Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In several 
other incidents, suspects were shot in the process of their 
arrest. While the government tried to justify these actions 
as “collateral damage” and an unavoidable result of dan-
gerous criminals resisting arrest, some human rights groups 
branded these actions as premeditated extrajudicial killings 
(Freedom House Report, 2007). 
On 18 September 2012, video footage showing the sys-
tematic torture of inmates in a Tbilisi prison was broadcast 
on television, shocking the public and putting an interna-
tional spotlight on the faults within Georgia’s criminal justice 
system. For years, government authorities failed to address 
repeated reports of widespread torture and mistreatment of 
prisoners. These problems affected a growing section of the 
population as Saakashvili’s “zero-tolerance” policy, even for 
petty crime, had quadrupled the number of prison inmates 
by the end of Saakashvili’s rule (Freedom House Report, 
2013).  
With the concept of building a strong, European-type 
state resting on several priorities including fighting corrup-
tion and organized crime, these latter issues were particu-
larly politicised and securitized. More extraordinary powers 
were given to the police and the prosecutor’s office and at 
the same time, police misconduct rose. Prison populations 
increased and breaches of human rights became a regu-
lar occurrence, including the mistreatment of detainees and 
prison inmates, and the excessive use of force all of which 
were seemingly tolerated; anti-crime policies were frequently 
based on double standards: the political elite and associates 
were allowed liberties while the rest of the population was 
kept under constant pressure and surveillance (Kuparadze, 
2012). 
Vano Merabishvili: “I need two dead bodies”
The Copenhagen School highlights the danger of securiti-
zation: the process can be abused by empowered special 
security forces in political and civil activities, or more worry-
ingly – civil liberties are curbed in the name of security of the 
nation. This is a risk that is especially relevant in weak and 
emerging democracies (Emmers, 2010, pp. 136-151).   
Here we should make references to the so-called mutiny of 
May 5, 2009, when the Mukrovani tank battalion “di-
sobeyed orders” after the government announcement it 
had uncovered a ‘Russian-backed plot’ to destabilize Geo-
rgia and overthrow President Saakashvili’s regime. In 
January 2014, the largest Georgian TV broadcasting com-
panies released video footage that showed details of a 
special operation led by Minister of Internal Affairs Vano 
Merabishvili during the Mukhrovani rebellion. Merabishvili, 
while giving orders to his subordinates, was demanding 
“two dead bodies” and for the successful mission they 
would be well rewarded. Later that month, Colonel Koba 
Otanadze and Major Levan Amiridze were heavily 
wounded and survived but General Giorgi Krialashvili was 
killed by the police while trying to escape. In 
Securitization of Georgia under the Saakashvili Rule
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878; Volume 4, Issue 1, 2015
35
2012, when political coalition “the Georgian Dream” came to 
power, both Otanadze and Amiridze were granted the sta-
tus of political prisoners and were freed. By requesting “two 
corpses”, Merabishvili and his entourage wanted to con-
vince the population of the existential nature of threat, which 
required an immediate response to tackle the life-and-death 
struggle with Kremlin’s puppet political forces in Georgia 
(agenda.ge, 2014). The rebellion would be linked with 
government plans to use troops to end mass opposition 
protests paralysing Tbilisi on the eve of the National Day 
celebrations and a planned military parade on Rustaveli 
Avenue.
The Georgian authorities had opted for the “zero toler-
ance” strategy with a clear aim: to mobilize popular support 
for the fight against organized crime and corruption and allo-
cate more resources to the sector, which became a security-
centric issue. However, in many cases the authorities used 
methods of intimidation, persecution and punishment “for 
the sake of European integration and building a modern and 
wealthy state”. The “speech act” suggested that all criminals 
should be imprisoned and that there was no room in Georgia 
for “thieves-in-law”. The leading media channels extensively 
covered police operations and the detention of culprits and 
corrupt bureaucrats, supposedly demonstrating their tough-
ness and efficiency but managing to mobilize popular sup-
port for the conducted policies (Kuparadze, 2012). 
The “Speech Act”
The Copenhagen School offers a two stage process of se-
curitization to explain how certain issues are portrayed as 
threats to referent objects and the most crucial stage of se-
curitization is a process of convincing a relevant audience 
(public opinion, political circles, or other elites) that a referent 
object is existentially threatened. If an actor has succeeded 
in gaining the public support, only then can extraordinary 
measures be imposed. The “Speech Act” is defined as the 
“discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential 
threat to security” and is considered as the starting point of 
the securitization (Emmers, 2010, p. 139)
The “Speech Act” has been considered by the Saakash-
vili regime as its main tool in the securitization model. After 
the Rose Revolution, he started consolidating the security 
concept and constructing existential threats to state secu-
rity that would capture the public’s imagination. In 2004, 
Saakashvili promoted a concept of building a dynamic 
European country: “Switzerland with elements of Sin-
gapore” – with EU and NATO membership as a final point. 
He wanted to uproot everything connected to a Soviet past 
and this very issue was extremely politicised. His desire 
was to transform the “Homo Soveticus” into a “Homo 
Georgicus”. Overnight, the reformers abolished the corrupt 
15,000-strong traffic police, reshuffled entire ministries and 
fired 30,000 bureaucrats. Georgia was ruled by a young, 
pragmatic generation that had thrown off its Soviet-era 
legacy. In 2010, the government removed the statue of 
former dictator Stalin from the square in his birthplace town 
Gori, and in 2011, the UNM-dominated parliament passed 
the law “the Freedom Chart”. Within two decades of the di-
ssolution of the Soviet Union, the “desovietization” process 
gained a new momentum with no sign of post communism 
revival in Georgia. Georgia’s 
modernization in many instances was aggressive and even 
brutal. But Saakashvili’s ambitions for Georgia’s transforma-
tion were tied to his efforts to radically transform the 
mindset of the Georgian people. Nearly every day, he was 
addressing Georgians through the TV screens: he labeled 
the intelligentsia as “sewage”, representatives of the 
Shevardnadze government - “criminals”, the population 
above 50 – “waste material” etc. However the “mental 
revolution” he designed would eventually backfire. In March 
2010 the “Imedi” television channel controlled by a member 
of the president’s team aired a “modeled documentary” 
depicting yet another Russian invasion scenario. The film, 
supposedly made with Saakashvili’s approval, aimed at ral-
lying the population against a Russian threat but actually 
infuriated Georgian society, signaling a visible thaw of rela-
tions between the leadership and the populace (The Eco-
nomist, 2010).   
Convincing the Population about Existential 
Threats to Security
Saakashvili and his associates were adept and skillful poli-
ticians capable of orchestrating strategies to convince the 
audience and manage PR plans both nationally and interna-
tionally with a well-built international networking system. The 
president’s administration hired prominent lobbying firms to 
portray Saakashvili’s government as a democratic and west-
ern reform-minded model for the region. Constructing luxury 
hotels, resorts and “Potemkin Villages”, governmental and 
police buildings were put forward while climbing rates of 
unemployment, lack of social welfare, widespread poverty 
and loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were neglected 
(Kavadze T. , 2013). In the meantime, the state propaganda 
machine continually reminded the population of “the mortal 
danger” coming from the big northern neighbor. Two particu-
lar examples highlight how the Georgian authorities actively 
tried to convince the audience of the danger of the threat as 
well as shifting public opinion from existing domestic prob-
lems and showing “a real danger coming from the main en-
emy - Russia” (Corso, 2011). 
The bus incident near the Abkhaz administrative 
border: On May 21, 2008, a mysterious armed incident oc-
curred near the border with the breakaway region of Abk-
hazia just as it was electing a new parliament of Georgia. 
Rocket-propelled grenades struck two buses in a Georgian-
controlled village on the Inguri River. Two women from 
Khurcha village were wounded in the attack. The Norwe-
gian Helsinki Committee and the Human Rights Centre of 
Georgia carried out an investigation on the attack that was 
revealed to have been staged by the Georgian side (Rimple, 
2008).
The Lopota incident: On 28 August 2012, Georgian 
Special Forces were engaged against an unidentified para-
military group of about 20 people which had allegedly taken 
several teenagers hostage in a village near the Dagestan 
section of the Georgian-Russian state border (Civil Georgia, 
2012). President Saakashvili immediately accused Russia 
of staging a provocation (Naroushvili, 2012). Public Defen-
der of Georgia Ucha Nanuashvili declared that his investi-
gation revealed circumstances contradicting the official ver-
sion of events that was offered by the government. Close 
to the date of the parliamentary elections, the Georgian 
authorities 
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used this paramilitary group to stage a “provocation” at the 
Russian border and the group was liquidated by Georgian 
military units (Civil Georgia, 2013). 
Both of these incidents show how the Georgian 
popula-tion reacted differently to acts of securitization, 
demonstrating the evolution in the effectiveness of 
securitization. In the case of the Khurcha bus incident, the 
audience accepted the formal assessment of the attack by 
“subversive gangs and separatist criminals” on the buses 
transporting local Georgians to the polling stations. 
Pumping this type of news on a daily basis helped the 
ruling party – the UNM—to win the elections with a large 
majority and to retain power. In the second scenario, the 
government failed to convince the electorate as to the 
material nature of the threat coming from Russia. The two 
incidents occurred in different time-frames: the first – in 
May 2008, before the August 2008 war with Russia, and 
second one – in August 2012, 4 years later. On 1 October 
2012, the UNM lost the Parliamentary elections. It was a 
clear indication of the failure of securitization in the long 
term: by enabling excesses and abuses of power, it 
ultimately had heavy consequences for the ruling elite. 
Building the Enemy Image
Since 2003, the Georgian ruling party has tried to present 
Russia as the main source of impending threat and the 
root of all Georgia’s troubles.  According to the parlance of 
Saakshvili regime “we, Georgians” are trustworthy, civilized, 
peace-loving, western oriented, modern society, “they, Rus-
sians” are cruel, retarded, evil forces: “Today one of the lead-
ers of the Russian Duma advised Georgia to kneel. Even 
though most of Georgia is in blackout, I want them to know 
that Georgia will never kneel. These people will never see a 
kneeled Georgian nation. ... Let’s not make these evil forces 
happy. Evil is fighting against good” (Saakashvili, 2006). 
The Russian theme always prevailed in Saakashvili’s 
speeches. The construction of the enemy image became a 
central pillar of his public speeches and televised interviews: 
“The very moment we slow down our European and Euro-
Atlantic integration, our independence and our sovereignty 
will be hungrily swallowed by a former Empire that has an 
unmistakable tendency to misunderstand the concept of 
borders. I know as well what it has cost us to affirm our inde-
pendence and our sovereignty in the face of a vengeful and 
revisionist Empire” (Saakashvili, 2013.).
Saakashvili never made any effort to defuse the 
tension between the two countries: relaxation of tension, 
overcoming the enemy image and hostile attitude and 
establishing trust between countries did not represent a top 
priority of his foreign policy and were unreachable tasks for 
him. “Saakashvili, for some strange reason, thought that 
the best way to separate Georgia from the enormous, 
irascible, and nuclear-armed country to its north was to do 
everything he could to infuriate the famously short-
tempered and vindictive Vladimir Putin...  It’s not hard to see 
why that “plan” ended in disaster” (Adomanis, 2013).
Opposition leaders and journalists expressing different 
opinions from the official positions were labeled as Russian 
spies; many of them were even arrested and sentenced. 
On July 7, 2011, three journalists - Giorgi Abdaladze, Irakli 
Gedenidze and Zurab Kurtsikidze were arrested and ac-
cused of passing “secret” information regarding the presi-
dent’s movements to Russian intelligence. In November 
2007, during mass protest rallies against the Saakashvili 
regime, the President put blame on the Georgian opposi-
tion party leaders, “who acted in accordance with Kremlin 
instructions” (Saakashvili, 2007). During election campaigns 
Mikheil Saakashvili frequently blackmailed political rivals 
and constantly depicted the main opposition forces as the 
Kremlin’s puppets (Saakashvili, 2012). It was later revealed 
that photographers had been framed as revenge for pictures 
they took on 26 May 2011, when police used tear gas, rub-
ber bullets and water cannons to end five days of opposition 
protests and to make way for a military parade. All “spies” 
were released from the prison in 2013 after a thorough 
investigation and the parliament of Georgia found them 
to be not guilty, recognising them as political prisoners of 
Saakashvili’s regime (Dzhindzhikhashvili, 2013). 
There is no doubt that Russia posed a serious threat 
to Georgian statehood: during the last two decades Rus-
sia could not tolerate Georgia’s independence, its aspira-
tions to join NATO and EU, and its strategic partnership 
with the US. They wanted to regain control over the South 
Caucasus where Georgia had always played a significant 
role. The scenario was also very similar to the current cri-
sis in Ukraine, where the Kremlin annexed Crimea in 2014 
and is arguably waging a proxy war in South-East Ukraine. 
However, Saakashvili’s government relationship with Rus-
sia was rarely adequate, characterized by rhetoric close 
to insulting the Russian leadership. On several occasions, 
Saakashvili even mocked Putin as “Lilli-Putin,” a reference 
to his height (Levy, 2009). The UNM-affiliated youth organi-
zation “Kmara” also organized protest actions in front of the 
Russian embassy in Tbilisi with the slogan “Gas-Putin”, a 
scornful play on gas delivery manipulations and Rasputin 
(Chivers, 2006). 
Saakashvili used every possible opportunity to offend 
Vlidimir Putin. In early 2009, Georgia proposed a song “We 
Don’t Wanna Put In” by Stephane & 3G, which was to be the 
Georgian entry to the Eurovision Song Contest being held 
in Moscow. The song caused scandal for its unambiguous 
political references to Putin. The European Broadcasting 
Union ruled that the song lyrics did not comply with Eurovi-
sion requirements and offered to rewrite the song or choose 
another entry. Despite the heavy pressure from internation-
al and domestic political circles to make alterations to the 
lyrics, Tbilisi took the decision that the song would not be 
amended thus on 11 March 2009, Georgia withdrew from 
the competition (Marcus, 2009). 
Very often, provocative and defiant actions of Saakash-
vili played into the hands of the Russian leadership. It gave 
the Kremlin free reign to act and fulfill a longstanding desire 
to put Georgia under the Russian fold or pushing forward its 
expansionist plans. In August 2008, Saakashvili provoked 
Russia with invasion and a full scale war. Putin struggled 
to hide his extremely negative attitude towards Saakashvili, 
once threatened the Georgian leader that he would like Mr. 
Saakashvili hung by his private parts (Levy, 2009). “The Rus-
sian deal was very clear: the Russians want me either killed 
or arrested, that’s what Putin said,” Saakashvili recently told 
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Bloomberg (Bedwel, Meyer, & Tromm, 2013). The two lead-
ers’ mutual personal dislike defined the current state of play 
between Russia and Georgia and exacerbated the nature of 
the threat posed by Russia to Georgian statehood.  
The Desecuritization of Georgia and 
Saakashvili’s “know-how” Exported to Ukraine
Despite the well-developed and coercive administrative 
and party structures, the “competitive authoritarian regime” 
of Saakashvili did not survive: the unification of opposition 
political forces under the wing of billionaire Ivanishvili rep-
resented the first real and eventually successful challenge 
to UNM (Levitsky & Way, 2010). As a result of heavy exter-
nal and internal pressure exerted on the ruling political elite, 
Saakashvili was forced to relinquish power. 
As soon as the Georgian Dream coalition led by Bidzi-
na Ivanishvili came into power in October 2012, it started the 
desecuritization process. The new government rejected the 
practice of politicizing issues prioritized by Saakashvili and 
the list of existential threats to the security of the country 
was reconsidered. The Russian threat which had once 
played a central and overarching role in Saakashvili’s 
securitization model was removed from the daily parlance 
of the ruling class. Instead Ivanishvili proposed a “do no 
harm” principle and promised to settle existing problems 
with Russia through dialog and goodwill. The new 
government offered more diplomatic language and a balan-
ced foreign policy to Russia, the most significant mani-
festation of which was its decision not to join sanctions 
against Russia over Ukraine and opening new channels of 
political communication (the Abashidze-Karasin talks) 
devoted mainly to boosting bilateral commercial and 
humanitarian ties. Nonetheless, while trade-economic rela-
tions have improved and tensions have subsided signi-
ficantly, political rapprochement between the two countries 
has not yet occurred. Between 2012 and 2014, Russia 
continued building barbed-wire fences establishing a de 
facto border between Georgia and occupied Georgian 
provinces – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014 and 
2015 the new agreements on allied relations and strategic 
partnership were concluded between Moscow and the 
occupied Georgian provinces with aiming at the de facto 
annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On top of that 
in July 2015 Russia’s expansion deep into Georgian 
territory in Kartli region covered sections of the strategic 
Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil-pipeline reaching such an alarming 
point in many western capitals. These developments sug-
gest that Ivanishvili’s foreign policy of appeasing the 
Kremlin and improving relations with Moscow has not 
yielded any significant results and actually failed (Kavadze 
& Kavadze, 2014).  
Notwithstanding that, Ivanishvili and his soon-to-be suc-
cessor Irakli Garibashvili declared the restoration of justice 
in Georgia as the nation’s top priority, which after thorough 
deliberation was transformed into a top political question. 
Following the 2012 October elections, many high ranking 
officials of Saakashvili government were arrested under 
various charges: former Prime-Minister and Minister of Inte-
rior Vano Merabishvili, former Defence and Interior Minister 
Bachana  Akhalaia, former Mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, 
and other key members of UNM. Former minister of Justice 
Zurab Adeishvili is wanted by Georgia and authorities have 
sent a request to Interpol to list him as a wanted suspect in 
the Red Notice database. In 2014, the Georgian 
Prosecutor’s Office filed charges against Saakashvili rela-
ting to abuses of power and embezzlement. The ex-
president escaped the arrest and resided in the US. Many 
EU and US leaders have however expressed their concern 
regarding the arrests of former key political figures. As 
stressed by the Council of Europe, the new political elite 
should not use the justice system to settle political scores 
with the UNM leadership (Antidze, 2015).
In the meantime, Saakashvili has offered his “know-
how” to president Poroshenko: the former was warmly re-
ceived by the new Ukrainian authorities and his entourage 
was granted a safe haven by Kiev. Former Georgian officials 
have taken senior governmental posts in Ukraine: Alexander 
Kvitashvili was appointed Minister of Healthcare, Eka Zgu-
ladze – deputy Minister of Interior; Gia Getsadze – first de-
puty Minister of Justice and David Sakvarelidze – first 
deputy Prosecutor General. Fugitive from Justice Zurab 
Adeishvili became a freelance adviser to the Ukrainian 
government and Saakashvili himself at the beginning was 
appointed chairman of the International Advisory Council 
on Reforms of Ukraine, and then governor of Odessa 
region. Since the charges were filed against Mikheil Saaka-
shvili and Zurab Adeishvili by the Georgian Prosecutor’s 
office, the latter has requested legal assistance and extra-
dition of the aforementioned persons. Ukraine has refused 
to extradite them, which puts it at odds in its bilateral rela-
tions of previously “good neighbours and strategic part-
ners”.  Saakashvili, now considered a friend of Ukraine at 
the highest levels, is beginning the process of reforms and 
much-needed positive changes in strategic Odessa region, 
as well as the construction of a new model of securitization, 
likely to only increase in magnitude (Buzan & Wæver, 
2009, pp. 253-276), (The Guardian, 2015).
Hopefully, Ukraine has learnt lessons from the Georgian 
experience and will avoid the same mistakes Georgia made 
in the recent past.  
Conclusion
The Saakashvili regime’s move on securitization in general 
was and continues to be controversial, contributing first to 
his rise and then the fall of his regime. Since the early days 
of the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili won immense 
popularity amongst the electorates, with audiences accep-
ting his speech act, his internal and international policies 
achieving their goals. It is evident that the formulation of 
threat perceptions and the decision making process in 
Georgia was constructed and dominated by the UNM elite. 
The government articulated certain priority issues as 
existential threats to national sovereignty as well as the 
Georgian society, and adopted extraordinary measures to 
tackle these problems. Saakashvili transformed the state 
bureaucratic system, succeeded in fighting corruption, 
organized crime and holding on to the province of Adjaria 
while mobilizing state institu-tions for further integration 
with European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But from 2007 
onwards, the Saakashvili regime started abusing their 
power and used securitization to effectively preserve the 
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 ailing regime:the ruling class ignored democratic principles 
and values, persecuted political rivals, gained control over 
media, subordinated core businesses in the country while 
the justice system became a private system of punishment 
and manipulation. In August 2008, Saakashvili provoked 
Russia into invasion and a full scale war with catastrophic 
consequences for Georgia. As a result, the majority of the 
Georgian population rejected his “speech act”, resulting in 
an overwhelming defeat at the October 2012 parliamentary 
elections. Since 2007, the priorities of Saakashvili’s 
government have shifted: regime survival became a key 
referent object of his securitization. He actively used secu-
rity language to boost his popularity and enhance pros-
pects of reelection. As a securitization agent - Saakashvili 
compromised fundamental democratic principles which had 
been fiercely defended during the Rose Revolution – and, 
as a consequence, failed in his bid to remain in power. 
Georgia during the last decade represents a startling illus-
tration of how securitization can be a key to consolidating 
power while ultimately sowing the seeds of its own political 
destruction. This process came full circle over a decade of 
Saakashvili’s rule. The research therefore shows that secu-
ritization can be applicable and in the short term is likely to 
succeed in post-communist and Eurocentric countries ruled 
by authoritarian or “competitive authoritarian” regimes. How-
ever, in the long run, securitization, by leading to the curb-
ing of basic freedoms and the introduction of far-reaching 
extraordinary measures in the name of security,cannot 
sustain itself and will inevitably fail. 
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